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CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-ADMISSIBILITY OF WIRETAP
EVIDENCE IN STATE COURTS
Dinan was convicted on charges of both conspiracy and bookmaking in
the County Court of Westchester County, New York. The principal evi-
dence presented against him was obtained by wiretap interception of
telephone conversations. Prior permission for the wiretapping was secured
by a court order as authorized under the New York State Constitution'
and the New York Criminal Code.2 Appealing to the Supreme Court of
New York, Appellate Division, the defendant took exception to the ad-
mission of the wiretap evidence. After affirmation, another appeal was
taken to the New York Court of Appeals. In a four-to-three decision, the
Court held that wiretap evidence obtained pursuant to a court order is
admissible in a state court prosecution notwithstanding the fact that both
the procurement and the divulgence of such evidence violates Section 605
of the Federal Communications Act.8 People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y. 2d 350,
183 N.E. 2d 689 (1962).
Few subjects in law are as bitterly controverted as wiretapping. Al-
though the majority of states have now concurred that wiretapping is
"dirty business ' 4 and prohibit it in any form, a significant number of law
enforcement officials obdurately defend its utilization in the detection and
conviction of criminals.5 The wiretap imbroglio is again brought into
sharp focus by several recent important cases. In New York, where some
judges refuse to issue orders authorizing wiretapping, the confusion is in-
creasingly acute, and the status of legalized wiretapping and its admissi-
bility as evidence in state criminal trials is becoming more and more
precarious.6
Benanti v. United States7 may have sounded the death-knell of wire-
tapping. Its final impact remains yet to be ascertained, but there is little
I N. Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 12.
2 N. Y. CODE OF CR. PROC., § 813-a.
3 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958). Hereafter referred to as Section 605.
4 Justice Holmes' colorful description of wiretapping in his dissent to Olnstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928).
5 DASH, SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959).
6 See Judge Medina's reluctant affirmance in United States ex rel Graziano v.
McMann, 275 F. 2d 286, 287 (2nd Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 851. While relying
on Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), Judge Medina admits in dictum that New
York's constitutional provision, legislation, and rules of evidence permitting wire-
tapping, in view of Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957), and the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, art. VI, Clause 2, may well constitute an in-
vasion of due process under the fourteenth amendment. He concludes that "the point
is novel and the solution far from clear."
7355 U.S. 96 (1957).
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doubt that the Benanti case, with its unanimous opinion by the United
States Supreme Court, presages a showdown in the wiretap controversy.
First, it abolishes the so-called "silver platter doctrine" whereby wiretap
evidence could be used in a federal case when it was obtained and turned
over by state officers, without any participation in the tap by federal
authorities.8 Secondly, the Benanti case makes wiretapping by state law
enforcement officials a federal offense regardless of the fact that it is done
pursuant to a court order and for the purpose of apprehending criminals.
Thirdly, it makes the divulgence of wiretap evidence to a jury, petit or
grand, literally a crime committed in a courtroom. Finally, in its most
ominous portent, it interprets Section 605 and finds that Congress "setting
out a prohibition in plain terms, did not mean to allow legislation which
would contradict that section and that policy."9
In Schwartz v. Texas,'0 which was qualified by Benanti, the United
States Supreme Court held that the introduction of wiretap data into
evidence, while it "would itself be a violation of the statute,"" could
nevertheless be used by the states pursuant to the rule of Wolf v. Colo-
rado.12 In Pugach v. Dollinger,8 an application was made to a federal
court for an injunction against the use of evidence obtained by court-
ordered wiretaps in a New York state criminal trial. Sitting en banc, the
federal court, while conceding that Section 605 would be violated by the
reception of such evidence, nonetheless affirmed denial of the injunction
on the basis of the Schwartz case and Stefanelli v. Minard.14 In a per
curiam opinion, which merely cited the Schwartz and Stefanelli cases, the
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the Pugacb case.' 5 It would seem
that in view of the distinction in Benanti of the limited holding in the
Schwartz case, the Court, at that time, continued to adhere to the doc-
trines of the Wolf case, and People v. Defore.16
8 See Note, 7 DE PAUL L. REV. 267 (1958).
9 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96,105, 106 (1957).
10 344 U.S. 199 (1952). 1l Id. at 201.
12338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Wolf case holds that evidence obtained by a state officer
by means which constitute an unlawful search and seizure under the fourth amendment
to the Constitution is nevertheless admissible in a state court.
1' 365 U.S. 458 (1961).
14342 U.S. 117 (1951). The Stefanelli case ruled that no such injunction should be
issued to preclude the use in a state court even of unconstitutionally seized evidence,
and cited Wolf v. Colorado as authority for the traditional reluctance of federal courts
to interfere collaterally in state judicial (especially criminal) proceedings.
15 365 U.S. 458 (1961).
16 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926). The Defore case ruled that decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States construing the fourth and fifth amendments of the
Constitution are not binding on state courts, and that a state may make its own rules
as to the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence.
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'Only four months later, the noteworthy case of Mapp v. Ohio,'7 involv-
ing introduction into evidence of material procured by an unlawful search
and seizure, was decided. For the first time, the Supreme Court held that
"all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Con-
stitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court."' 8 Both
the Wolf case, and the key precedent for the admissibility of wiretap
evidence in New York state courts, the Defore case, were specifically
overruled by rejection of their holdings that United States. Supreme Court
decisions construing the fourth and fifth amendments of the Constitution
are not binding upon the states. By this overruling of Wolf, the authority
of the federal precedent for the constitutionality of wiretap legislation in
New York, the Schwartz case, is weakened still further. First, the later
Benanti case severely limited the extension of Schwartz, and now the
Mapp case destroys the pillar on which Schwartz rested, the case of Wolf
v. Colorado. By the same token, the reiteration in the Stefanelli case of
the traditional reluctance of federal courts to meddle in state criminal
proceedings is now brought into question. Thus, at least to the extent
that the admission of wiretap evidence is dependent upon precedent cases
ruling that evidence may be admitted which has been procured in viola-
tion of Constitutional prohibitions, wiretapping in New York is subjected
to a twofold attack: First, the Mapp case overrules Defore, the state case
upon which its constitutionality depends; secondly, Mapp also severely
undermines its federal precedent, the Schwartz case, by overruling Wolf
v. Colorado, upon which Schwartz relies. The ultimate question is, of
course, whether or not the Mapp case will be extended, by analogy, to
include violation of federal statutes notwithstanding state legislation pur-
porting to allow such abridgment.
Certain dicta may be considered as offering some indication as to the
trend of future decisions. Justice Douglas, in his dissent to Pugach v.
Dollinger,19 holds that the Benanti case sweeps away the rationale of the
Schwartz case. In his dissent to Rathbun v. United States,20 Justice Frank-
furter rejects the plausible contention that "the well-known authorization
of wiretapping by some states ought to have qualified the strict purpose
of Congress (expressed in Section 605) ."21 With perhaps less weight, but
a much firmer indication of a trend, is the dissent in the Dinan case. Here,
the three justices cited Benanti and Mapp as controlling, and despite a
prior recent decision contra,'22 contended that the use of wiretap evidence
in the courts of New York should be barred as a matter of law.
17 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
18 Id. at 655. 20 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
19 365 U.S. 458, 460 (1961). 21 Id. at 114.
22 People v. Variano, 5 N.Y. 2d 391, 157 N.E. 2d 857 (1959).
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On the other hand, a more conservative approach to these questions is
indicated by the case of Williams v. Ball.23 In that case, petitioners, under
indictment, sought a declaration in a federal court that the New York
constitutional provision and New York statute authorizing wiretapping
be declared unconstitutional, and that a temporary injunction be issued
against the state prosecution in which the wiretap evidence was to be
used. In affirming dismissal of the petition, the federal court said, "we do
not read Mapp v. Ohio as overruling sub silentio Schwartz v. Texas, on
which six justices expressly relied, only four months earlier, in a per
curiam affirmance of Pugach v. Dollinger.' 2 4 Negativing any notion that
the Pugach case should be reconsidered in the light of the Mapp case, the
court went on to assert that Mapp can be said to furnish no basis for an
extension of its application to a state's receiving evidence of which the
divulgence would violate a federal statute.25 In a timely judicial aside, the
court, lamenting the fact that Congress has not acted on the many pro-
posals dealing with the wiretap problem,26 announced its intention of
holding to the Pugach case which refused to enjoin the introduction of
wiretap evidence in a state criminal proceeding. That the true assessment
of the Schwartz, Benanti, Pugach and Mapp cases remains yet to be de-
termined is illustrated by Bolger v. Cleary.27 In that case, it was held that
a federal court has power to enjoin a state official from testifying in a
state criminal proceeding as to information learned by him as a result of
his cooperation with federal officials in an unlawful search and seizure
and in an illegal detention. In granting the injunction, the court relied on
the Mapp case.
Under the new Illinois Criminal Code28 and by the avowed intention
of its drafters, Illinois is classified with the majority of states which are
"total prohibition" jurisdictions in the matter of wiretapping. People v.
Dixon29 may, however, subject the new code to a test. In that case, police
officials cooperated with a narcotics user in arranging for a controlled
purchase of narcotics from the defendant. The Illinois Supreme Court
decided that the testimony of a police officer regarding a monitored tele-
phone conversation between the user and the defendant was not inad-
missible in the trial under the Electronic Eavesdropping Statute,30 where
the officer listened in on an extension telephone, and the user, who made
23 294 F. 2d 94 (2d Cir. 1961).
24 1d. at 96. 25 Id. at 96 (dictum).
26 S. 1086 and S. 2813 are now pending in Congress.
27 293 F. 2d 368 (2d Cir. 1961). 28 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 (1961).
29 22 111. 2d 513, 177 N.E. 2d 224 (1961).
80 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 14-1 to S 14-7 (1961).
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the call, consented to the action. Similarly, in People v. Malotte,81 it was
held that police officials may listen in if they obtain the consent of one
of the parties to the conversation. This ruling has been stretched to cover
a vast area of wiretapping with the subscriber's permission, whether or
not the subscriber is a party to the conversation. While the Supreme
Court of the United States decided in Rathbun v. United States82 that
listening in on a regular extension line is not wiretapping, the possibility
of such an extension of the Dixon case to allow limited wiretapping in
Illinois by law enforcement officials remains an intriguing subject for
conjecture.
In the final analysis, it is apparent that until Congress resolves the prob-
lem by clarifying legislation, or the United States Supreme Court grants
certiorari to another wiretap case which addresses the question of the rela-
tion of the Schwart, Benanti, Pugach and Mapp cases, the final denounce-
ment of the wiretap drama will necessarily remain an enigma. Until the
strongly implied condemnation of wiretapping expressed in the Benanti
case is less qualified, or the rationale of the Mapp case is extended from
constitutional prohibitions to federal statutes, Dinan points to a tenacious
adherence by New York to its legislation permitting wiretapping by
police officials.
8146 Cal. 2d 59, 292 P. 2d 517 (1956).
82 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
AND ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
In a trial which took place prior to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Mapp v. Ohio,' defendant was convicted of having violated
the State of New York's gambling laws.2 On appeal, after the Mapp de-
cision, defendant initially raised the issue that the evidence upon which
he was convicted was obtained by an unlawful search and seizure. The
New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction without looking into
the question of the alleged illegality of the search and seizure. In so hold-
ing the Court found that it had no grounds upon which to review as no
objection was taken at the trial to the introduction of the evidence. It
was also stated by the Court that there was no mention in the record of
the circumstances of the alleged illegal search and seizure. Further, the
1 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Mapp case held that evidence obtained as *a result of an
illegal search and seizure must be excluded in State courts as it violates the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 986, 986b.
